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ABStrACt
this article provides a response to David Hume’s argument against the plausibility of miracles 
as found in Section 10 of his An enquiry concerning human understanding by means of Charles 
Sanders Peirce’s method of retroduction, hypothetic inference, and abduction, as it is explicated 
and applied in his article entitled A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God, rather than fo‑
cusing primarily on Peirce’s explicit reaction to Hume in regard to miracles, as found in Hume 
on miracles. the main focus will be on Peirce’s neglected argument rather than his explicit 
confrontation with Hume on the issue of miracles, because his criticisms of Hume demands 
a methodological approach appropriate for scientifically analysing surprising phenomena or 
outliers, of which miracles or the reality of god would be but two examples amongst many. 
this article, then, consists of an attempt to construct this method as one that draws inferences 
neither a priori nor a posteriori, but per posterius, because such a method is capable of rigorously 
questioning rogue or surprising phenomena, e.g. miracles.
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this article’s more modest aim is to provide a response to David Hume’s ar‑
gument against the possibility of miracles as found in Section X of his An 
enquiry concerning human understanding by means of Charles Sanders Peirce’s 
method of retroduction, hypothetic inference or abduction as it is explicated 
and applied in his article entitled A Neglected Argument for the reality of God.1 
naturally, use will also be made of Peirce’s most focused treatment of Hume’s 
argument against the plausibility of miracles in Hume on miracles,2 although in 
that essay Peirce’s method is not treated in detail and, more importantly, not 
exemplified. this article, then, has the advantage of being able to limit itself to 
a close reading of only three articles. the implications, however, can be broad‑
ened so that one discovers the need for a general methodological approach 
appropriate for analyzing surprising phenomena or outliers, of which miracles 
or even the reality of god might be but two possible examples. In short, this 
article’s more ambitious, even audacious, aim is to argue for a method that 
demands that the horizons of scientific knowledge itself be broadened. In this 
way science might avoid having to dismiss surprising phenomena out of hand 
as phantasmal. In other words, it might still be able to handle phenomena that 
seemingly threaten the idea of the law of nature and, therefore, also the mod‑
ern scientific enterprise. Let miracles be defined as chance irruptions or events 
without precedent, which, given Peirce’s tychism or his belief that things are 
not merely determined by their precedent, i.e. that indeterminacy plays a role 
in the world, Peirce cannot dismiss out of hand. miracles therefore represent 
a limit case for an entire domain of unpredictable observations that would also 
include phenomena as relevant as human (or divine) freedom, or genial art 
and physical indeterminacy. Such phenomena always retain the possibility of 
catching the observer by surprise. In short, a method is required that adapts 
itself to the phenomenon itself as the ultimate criterion rather than discarding 
phenomena incompatible with a given method. this is the case if for no other 
reason than that science is, for Peirce, decidedly not  determined by immutable 
laws throughout. Laws and methods must be adapted to phenomena and not 
vice versa.
Hume AgAInSt teStImOnY, Hume AgAInSt mIrACLeS
this author’s contention is that David Hume did not just argue against the 
plausibility of belief in miracles based on testimony in fact, but in pr inc iple. 
this is, at least, the result if one reads Hume literally and by the letter (which 
1  this can be found in Anderson, 1995.
2  this can be found in Pierce, 1931–1935: 522–547. All quotations will be cited according 
to the following example, CP 6.525, where “CP” indicates Collected Papers, “6” the volume 
number and “525” the paragraph number.
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Peirce himself does not do insofar as, in his essay, Hume on miracles, he rejects 
Hume’s own definition of a miracle as an event that contravenes the laws of na‑
ture). read according to the letter — which also means to read Hume against 
his own intentions — Hume argued, as shall be seen, not just that accounts of 
miracles are implausible in fact, but that they could never be plausible in prin‑
ciple, i.e. that they are not even possibly plausible. Although Hume proceeded 
in section II of his chapter against the credibility of the testimony of miracles 
to enumerate four reasons why evidence in favor of miracles is either insuffi‑
cient or disingenuous, his definitive argument against testimonies of miracles 
is not really empiricist or evidentialist. At bottom, Hume did not so much 
argue that evidence for miracles was simply lacking, but he actually presented 
an a priori argument against their plausibility, i.e. even against the possibility 
that any amount of testimony ever could be enough. In short, should an ac‑
count of a miracle ever be able to acquire enough evidence and testimony on its 
behalf to counterbalance or outweigh the evidence in favour of the uniformity 
of nature, i.e. the laws of nature, then it would be annexed by that same prin‑
ciple of uniformity, causing the accounts of the miracle to lose their surprising 
character and cease being an outlier to laws of nature. It would cease to be an 
account of a miracle, which according to Hume’s definition is nothing other 
than “a violation of the laws of nature” (Hume, 1999: 116), and would instead 
be a mere observation of nature in its regularity, albeit witnessed by one ap‑
parently uneducated in nature’s laws. Hume’s argument, therefore, really rests 
upon the def init ion of  a miracle and his rule, to be deduct ive ly  applied, 
that eye ‑witness accounts, when in contradiction with known laws of nature, 
ought always and everywhere, i.e. universally, to be disbelieved. As robert H. 
Ayers confirms, “Hume’s formal definition was often taken as the basis for 
the argument that by definition miracles are impossible” (Ayers, 1980: 243). 
Despite Hume’s infamous empiricism, his basic argument actually operates 
a priori, analytically and deductively. One need not have the slightest experi‑
ence of evidence pro or con for any part icular  miraculous event. By defini‑
tion, irrespective of any possible experience based on the testimony of others 
— and surely even one’s own experience of a miracle, i.e. a violation of nature’s 
laws, would have to be called into question for these reasons — one ought to 
recognise the incredulousness of believing in any and a l l  accounts of miracles. 
If a phenomenon — or the testimony of a phenomenon — is surprising, be‑
cause it does not occur within the uniformity of nature, then one ought always 
withhold (and even deny) one’s assent to the phenomenon under question. For 
Hume, at least if we take him at his literal word, belief or disbelief in nature’s 
outliers, whatever they may be, is not really an issue concerning a matter of 
fact, but rather a matter of principle. Hume, of course, does not fail to state as 
much insofar as his express intention is to provide a definitive argument against 
the credibility of any alleged religious miracle. He does not feel the need to 
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discredit stories of miracles individually as that was already a well ‑practiced 
custom of his time.3
One may retort that Hume remained empirical in his approach because the 
uniformity of nature itself is only arrived at by means of the principle of induc‑
tion and his notion of constant conjunction. Concerning the former, Hume 
wrote that the wise man “regards his past experience as a full proof  of the 
future existence of that event” (Hume, 1999: 113) and that “the maxim, by 
which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is that the objects of 
which we have no experience resemble those of which we have; that what we 
have found to be most usual is always most probable” (Hume, 1999: 117). even 
when certain appearances may appear to conflict with the otherwise uniform 
appearances, one should always side with the greater, i.e. one ought to appeal 
to probability. “Probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and 
observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other” (Hume, 
1999: 113). moreover, an account of a miracle — were it but even possibly 
credible — would be a testimony about a matter of fact and all matters of fact 
can only be known through experience. these genuinely empirical elements 
must be admitted, but this does not preclude Hume from prescinding the pos‑
sibility of certain matters of fact, or at least the possibility of their credibility, 
prior to the accumulation of present and repeatable empirical evidence. When 
constant conjunction is lacking in the least, i.e. when the conjunction is fre‑
quent but not constant or without variation, then certain outliers have raised 
their head, deviations from the norm. these deviants do not in fact  have the 
weight of evidence on their side, but Hume wants to imply that they could… 
they just do not. the miracle ‑account, however — and this is the crux of the 
issue — is deviant by definition. Its plausibility is prescinded in advance of any 
experience that may subsequently corroborate it. If sufficient corroboration for 
the surprising and irregular event were found, then it would not be what it is, 
namely a witness of a miracle, a violation of nature’s laws, a violation of nature’s 
regularity. It would instead become just another testimony for a law of nature 
and its uniformity, only perhaps a law as of yet unknown.
the experience that established the laws of nature, says Hume, is “unalter‑
able” (Hume, 1999: 116). the law is established or rather comes to be known 
a posteriori through the principle of induction and constant conjunction, but 
once it has been written by these “principles”, which by Hume’s own admission 
and as is well known are not apodictically founded but simply psychological 
explanations, it becomes set in stone, as if manna passed down from Heaven. 
the laws that arose simply by generalization from particulars, that have no 
a priori connection between them, have become utterly inviolable. these past 
3  note as examples of this writings by thomas Woolston (2010) and Peter Annet (2010), 
first published in 1744, only four years prior to Hume’s Enquiry.
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accounts of miracles have now, i.e. after the formulation of a law of nature, 
unalterably lost any possible credibility. Accordingly, given Hume’s definition 
of a miracle as a violation of nature’s uniformity, “nothing is esteemed a mira‑
cle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature” (Hume, 1999: 116). 
“Common” in “common course” obviously refers for Hume to the frequency 
of an event and not the qualitative aspect of its occurrence. Qualitatively the 
birth of a child, even one’s fifth or sixth, is certainly more than common, what 
many in common parlance refer to as miraculous. Quantitatively, however, the 
event falls squarely within nature’s “common” procreative occurrences. Hume 
himself suggests that despite a certain uncommonness or uncanny nature that 
a man in perfect health may suddenly die, this does not, apparently, constitute 
something uncommon. Part I of Hume’s text actually shows that Part II is only 
a psychological support, as if an addendum attached to his text only in order 
to speak to the psychology of the “common” person who may yet still require 
other matters of fact. As for Hume himself, he is surely convinced prior to the 
presentation of the eye ‑witness testimonies. the case is clear prior to any ex‑
amination of testimonial evidence that historians may or may not yield.
Before continuing, it is worthwhile to draw attention to one instance where 
Hume, while not necessarily believing himself, does seem to admit the pos‑
sibility of justly believing in a miracle on the basis of testimony. He remarks, 
“there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, 
of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; though perhaps, 
it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history” (Hume, 
1999: 184). He then offers as an example the possibility that all authors from 
all cultures agree in their account that on the first of January in the year 1600 
total darkness lasted over the whole earth for eight days. given that there 
might be such consensus on the basis of historical testimony, he concludes, “It 
is evident, that our present philosophers, instead of doubting the fact, ought to 
receive it as certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be de‑
rived” (Hume, 1999: 184). It must be noted, however, that in response to this 
fact, which is not to be doubted, Hume suggests that philosophers, while not 
believing themselves but only not doubting and “receiving as certain”, ought 
to search for the causes of this “miraculous” event. Hume does not in fact 
waver here. While he admits that nature might “have a tendency towards that 
catastrophe” (Hume, 1999: 184), he nevertheless remains convinced that phi‑
losophers (or perhaps scientists) can find the cause — and this means a cause 
of nature, i.e. a cause immanent to nature herself — of the “decay, corruption, 
and dissolution of nature” (Hume, 1999: 184) in this peculiar event. this, 
then, for Hume, would not constitute a suspension of or outlier from nature’s 
laws, but only one of its possible extremities. the cause of this decay or cor‑
ruption of  nature would not actually fit Hume’s definition of a miracle as 
a violation of the laws of nature. Perhaps there was a dark and noxious cloud 
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covering the entire earth that took eight days to dissipate. this is no miracle, 
not even according to the definition of a miracle accepted by Hume, but only 
an extreme instance of its uniform laws, the law of nature pushed to its bound‑
ary but not to its breaking point, i.e. not beyond the boundary or outside na‑
ture’s laws. Hume does not admit here so much the possibility that a “miracle” 
might be corroborated through testimony than that testimony might serve as 
good cause for philosophy and science to consider a revision or reformulation 
of nature’s laws.
Hume’s argument against miracles and their credibility through testimony 
betrays a deductive rather than an exclusively inductive approach. the infer‑
ence has been made and the conclusion drawn at the expense of testimonial 
experience, not just in fact but according to principle. this reading of Hume, 
however, while a bit unorthodox, perhaps does not constitute any real novelty 
as such. the more interesting thesis will follow upon the proceeding reading 
of Charles Sanders Peirce’s neglected Argument for the reality of god.
As will be seen, the methodology of Charles Sanders Peirce encompasses 
both deductive and inductive moments, arguably with the advantage of being 
able to comprehend and legitimately take stock of certain phenomena that, 
for Hume, are to be dismissed as phantasmal outliers. Peirce’s position should 
widen the scope of possible scientific research, proving less susceptible to the 
tendency to dismiss that which cannot be explained by conventional means 
alone. Peirce befittingly offers rogue explanations for surprising or rogue oc‑
currences. Just such a methodology is exemplified, in this author’s opinion, 
most poignantly in his neglected Argument for the reality of god.
PeIrCe, ArgumentS AnD tHe reALItY OF gOD
In order to understand Peirce’s neglected Argument for the reality of god, 
which is perhaps the prime exemplar of his method of abduction, one must 
first come to terms with his methodology, variously termed abduction, hy‑
pothetic inference or retroduction. the main point to be noted, insofar as 
this study is concerned, is the elucidation of his method, for which, again, 
the Argument for the reality of god serves as an illustrative or paradigmatic 
example. In order to understand Peirce’s methodology one must literally come 
to terms, i.e. understand and see the relation between a series of definitions. 
Only those necessary for the understanding of the argument here shall be ex‑
plicated. god, for Peirce, is a definable proper name. this scientific methodol‑
ogy therefore concerns not the general but the individual, not the generic but 
the indexical. Science normally concerns the general, but Peirce’s methodology 
already breaks the traditional mould by deigning to be a science of the indi‑
vidual — which Aristotle has long since deemed impossible. the individual in 
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this text, however, does not mean atomic individuals, not isolated individuals, 
but a science of individuals all the same.4 Of course, that being said, a science 
of individuals cannot merely be a nominalist presentation of individuals as in‑
dividuals but must explicate particulars by means of general laws and concepts. 
god is, therefore, something like a universal individual, the individual who 
coincides with his general understandability.
An Idea is anything whose Being may be fully represented, comparable to 
Plato’s Idea (Anderson, 1995: 118). An Idea may or may not be instantiated in 
the actual world or, in Peirce’s terms, it may or may not be Actual, but Ideas 
are real or they are at least real as Possible, i.e. possibly Actual.
A thing is real if it has Properties that may identify the subject under ques‑
tion. these cannot be phantasmal Properties — nor are they necessarily Actual 
— but they are Properties that are true when predicated of the real subject 
(Anderson, 1995: 118). the Actual is “that which is met with in the past, pre‑
sent, or future” (Anderson, 1995: 118). Accordingly, something may be real 
and have true Properties, that is Properties which really would represent that 
thing and not some other, without having to be Actual at some time t.
Ideas correspond to Peirce’s category of Firstness or qualitative immediacy, 
Actualities to his category of Secondness or instantiations of the possibility 
of Firstness, and the real corresponds to his category of thirdness or me‑
diation, i.e. the general understandability among Actual particularities. these 
three categories of Peirce’s formulate in general what is formulated more par‑
ticularly in the following three universes of experience.
An experience, generally defined, is a produced and habit ‑inducing conscious 
effect that, while under the ‘self ‑control’ of the agent (Anderson, 1995: 118), is 
nevertheless produced Brutally, meaning that the experience “nowise consists 
in conformity to rule or reason” (Anderson, 1995: 119). One finds, then, in 
Peirce, neither facts in themselves (secondness) which would be given abso‑
lutely, i.e. apart from the habit ‑inducing consciousness (thirdness) of which 
it is an effect, nor a rigid adherence to the principle of sufficient reason. the 
Brutal aspect of experience, that aspect which is absolute or which remains 
unconditioned by the consciousness of the agent, does not filter experience 
through reasons or pre ‑given conceptions. experiences are therefore possible, 
at least in principle, which occur without reason, which fall under no catego‑
ries or pre ‑given rational structures under which the experience must occur or 
be dismissed as phantasmal. One here sees Peirce’s doctrine of tychism at play, 
namely, the conviction that not everything which happens occurs according 
to the regularity of law and that the formulation of law itself is the product of 
4  Peirce was a critic of Hume’s atomism, who attempted to do things like reduce the soul 
to a merely atomic assemblage, i.e. bundle, of sensations and, in the Treatise of human nature at 
least, argue for the atomic point as a real indivisible. In this vein, one should note that atomism 
constitutes the basis of Hume’s nominalism. 
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habit ‑inducing consciousness. Habit ‑inducing consciousness which conditions 
or produces experience as an effect, is thus pragmatic rather than theoretical 
in nature. In other words, consciousness is pragmatic before it is epistemic. 
A law of nature is thus arguably nothing more than the habit of nature or, at 
least, the effect that nature renders upon habit ‑inducing consciousness. At any 
rate, there is nothing in Peirce that stipulates that experience must occur ac‑
cording to pre ‑given rational structures, be they laws/categories of conscious‑
ness, laws of nature or the principle of sufficient reason. In the abstract terms 
of Peirce, secondness must precede thirdness as its condition; science is always 
of  individual Actualities (secondness) even if it is to be explicated in terms of 
the universal (thirdness), a real which cannot just be a nominal and abstract 
construction of the mind or habit ‑inducing consciousness. Consciousness does 
not conjure abstract realities out of thin air, but only as the law ‑l ike character 
(habit) that regulates secondness or particular Actualities. Law, as it were, is 
a formulation consequent upon and not antecedent to Actualities. Consequent‑
ly, it cannot, therefore, be governing of Actualities.
there are then three universes of experience, the first comprises mere 
Ideas that are real, i.e. Possible, insofar as they might  find representation or 
be thought but are not necessarily Actual insofar as they do not have to be his‑
torically instantiated, though they could be. the second universe is populated 
by the Brute Actuality of things, which presumably escapes, at least possibly, 
the first universe as the domain of what can possibly find rational representa‑
tion. In other words, this universe, at least aspects of it, qua Brutal, surely 
escapes possible representation, minimally the fact that it is Actual rather than 
just Possible, that is not only something conceivable and representable but also 
Actual. In short, it is to be doubted that the first universe necessarily circum‑
scribes the second, that possibility necessarily leads to actuality. It could have 
been the case that there were never any Actualities, i.e. there could have been 
nothing instead of something. What is rational is indeed real, but Brute‑
ness or Actuality is not, in turn, reducible to rational representation, to what 
is Possible. there is, at least, no reason to assume this is the case for Peirce. 
the third universe consists of those things that have the capability of estab‑
lishing connections between different objects, especially those from different 
universes of experience. these are what one calls Signs, not the material sig‑
nifier, e.g. the written statement or a concatenation of phonemes — which is 
but an instance of secondness or the Actual — but the signified or the Soul 
of the statement, e.g. the proposition expressed by means of a Brute statement 
(Anderson, 1995: 119). While the first and third universe would presumably 
always admit of a reason and, by extension, a possible law, the second universe, 
due to its Bruteness or in “nowise conforming to rule or reason”, escapes the 
principle of sufficient reason; it very well may be groundless or without reason. 
Presumably, if it finds representation in an Idea by means of a Sign — which 
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is far from necessary — it would find representation as the Idea of a fact, 
namely that which has no reason but just is as it is. A Brute facticity is to be 
accepted or not, corroborated or not, but certainly not to be derived by means 
of a pre ‑given law or rule of inference. Brutality points not just to the Actual‑
ity of things, but more importantly to their Facticity, that they are contingents 
and not necessary results from necessary forms of reasoning or necessary laws 
of nature. All of this, however, points to Peirce’s doctrine of tychism, namely, 
that absolute chance, as well as law, has a role to play in the universe.5
An Argument differs from an Argumentation. the Argument informally 
tends toward the production of a determined belief, while Argumentation for‑
mally proceeds “upon definitely formulated premises” (Anderson, 1995: 119). 
Argumentation is syllogistic, deriving results from premises or rules of infer‑
ence that precede and, accordingly, trump the facticity or Bruteness of experi‑
ence. An Argument, on the other hand, is more fitting for an experience that 
flouts the accepted premises and rules of inference, for an experience that does 
not find ready ‑made representation under an Idea by means of a Sign. In Ar‑
gumentation premises and rules of procedure are the absolute criteria, whereas 
in an Argument the Bruteness of experience operates as the uncircumventable 
criterion, upon which the rules and procedures of a subsequent Argumentation 
would have to be based and not vice versa.
An Argument for the reality of god would hence not be a syllogism, but 
it would operate much less formally — even informally — although that by 
no means entails that there would not be specific methodological principles to 
follow. the difference is that these principles would fo l low according to the 
nature of the Brute experience rather than precede as the conditions under 
which experience must occur if the experience is to be accepted as legitimate 
rather than phantasmal. this, of course, is precisely what Hume is not willing 
to admit. Said differently, Peirce rejects, if one will, the uniformity of nature 
without rejecting its regularity or, as he might instead say, continuity. nature’s 
uniformity is, again, but nature’s continuity or habit  of being, its habitual 
mode of being, its modus operandi, but nature is not uniform by means of 
a law precedent to the occurrences of nature itself. Douglass r. Anderson once 
stated that “Peirce’s rejection of nature’s uniformity was not a rejection of its 
regularity” (Anderson, 2010: 234), but it does decidedly reject that nature’s 
regularity is a result of a law that governs it in advance of its facticity, i.e. its 
Brutality. the regularity or continuity of nature can only be explicated a f ter 
the fact, only a f ter  it has occurred in a continuous rather than discontinuous 
way, in a habitual rather than erratic way, but there is no uniformity that de‑
termines the occurrences of nature in advance.
5  that both chance and law play a role in the universe is why Peirce’s tychism must always 
be complemented with his Synechism, which draws connections between events.
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to return to Peirce’s neglected Argument itself, god could be real even if 
never Actually occurring at some point within history. god could be known 
through His Properties or rather through experience, which is a conscious ef‑
fect that leads to habit, i.e. to a certain conduct or way of life. As real rather 
than Actual, however, the experience of god is surely not sensible and thus 
not testable, not necessarily repeatable and thus not verifiable (or falsifiable). 
Here the science of the individual or the one ‑time occurrence is only able to be 
witnessed, that is testified to, but never repeatable under observable conditions. 
this one ‑time or, at least, sporadic experience is, despite its infrequency, still 
able to be productive of a habit or way of life/habitude and is therefore far from 
trivial; it is not to be dismissed as insignificant. the corresponding Argument, 
not proof or Argumentation, would then not be academic merely, e.g. an infer‑
ence to the god of the philosophers. rather, it would make inference to a god 
commensurate with religious representation, one “adequate for the conduct of 
life” (Anderson, 1995: 119). this constitutes, en brève, the bare bones of the 
neglected Argument.
now, Peirce coyly questions “into what else than «origins» of phenomena (in 
some sense of that indefinite word) man can inquire” (Anderson, 1995: 121). 
Science must be able to move past the Humean Ockhamism of “direct observa‑
tion” (Anderson, 1995: 121), i.e. past the nominalism at the root of Hume’s at‑
omism. All experience, despite its Brutal character, is produced as a conscious 
effect relevant for the pragmatic side of life. Hume, on the other hand, given 
his notion of constant conjunction, seems to be equipped with a very limited 
methodology, namely, one that will only allow him to admit of isolated caus‑
es that can constantly occur in conjunction within certain sense experiences, 
that is as atomist ic  impressions or parts outside of parts. this constitutes 
Hume’s Ockhamism (as well as his failure to overcome the problems of the as‑
sociationism of ideas and continuity inherited from Locke). (Peirce, a prolific 
writer on the scientific method, repeatedly expressed his dissatisfaction with 
“Ockhamist” thinkers whose ontologies were dominated by discretely indi‑
vidual facts at the expense of hypothesis ‑formation, which would organically 
situate these facts into a whole.) In other words, for Hume, both cause and 
effect must be Actual impressions, i.e. an experience like the one in Peirce’s 
second universe of experience comprised of the Brute Actuality of things. 
However, as is well known, the relation between cause and effect never leaves 
an impression or is never an item of experience. Furthermore, for Hume, in 
the case of god not only is the link between cause and effect never given as 
a sense ‑impression nor is the cause. All that is given as an impression is the 
effect and for constant conjunction to do its magic both cause and effect must 
be supplied by the senses in order that the mind might draw them into a causal 
relation. For Peirce, however, experience is only the effect. there is no experi‑
ence of the Brute fact as such, only an effect, i.e. the experience, which does 
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not necessarily conform to rule or reason. Hume, by contrast, cannot possibly 
admit of a cause that would be an origin beyond direct or Brutal observation. 
Already, one sees how Peirce’s methodology, if feasible, would expand the bor‑
ders of an otherwise overly limited enlightenment science. Peirce’s approach, 
on the one hand, allows for the explication of “partly experienced phenomena” 
(Anderson, 1995: 122), while Hume’s approach, on the other hand, demands 
that both the cause and the effect fall within the Actual experience, i.e. as an 
impression, in order even to qualify as something real, let alone Actual.
By observing and ruminating on the connections within and between each 
of the universes of experience, says Peirce, one will be lead to postulate the 
reality of god as the hypothesis that accounts for this unity. this hypothesis, 
however, has as its object a being that is thought as “infinitely incomprehensi‑
ble” (Anderson, 1995: 124). Yet, given the origin of the hypothesis, something 
is also known, at least partly, about the nature of the hypothesised object. 
Peirce proposes that through further and further experience the hypothesis 
would “tend” “to define itself more and more”, and “without limit” (Anderson, 
1995: 124). this hypothesis is, as it were, in Kantian terms, regulative rather 
than constitutive or, in Peircean terms, an instance of thirdness or general 
regularity and continuity rather than an instance of secondness or a particular 
law operating as a Brute fact that would determine the uniformity of nature. 
Peirce’s asymptotic ideal would thus correspond to the infinitely incomprehen‑
sible object that signifies but the absolute limit of comprehensibility. Peirce’s 
Argument is not a closed one, not a piece of Argumentation, but open ‑ended, 
tending toward a determinate but asymptotic limit. the hypothesis of the re‑
ality of god, just as any hypothesis, will never be wholly determinate and true, 
having arrived at an impossible totality via the empirical road — to again make 
allusion to Immanuel Kant — but nor will it ever be “flatly false” (Anderson, 
1995: 124). the aim is that the erection of the hypothesis would be “less false” 
(Anderson, 1995: 124) than its denial. no hypotheses are to be dismissed out 
of hand.
As mentioned above, Peirce’s methodology employs both deductive and in‑
ductive modes of inference. Despite the deductive component, the Argument 
as a whole begins in experience. As Peirce affirms, “All our knowledge may be 
said to rest upon observed facts” (CP: 6.522). experience serves as the impetus 
for all inquiry, because one does not question and inquire about that which 
only confirms the status quo. Something only becomes a subject for ques‑
tion and debate with the experience of “some surprising phenomenon, some 
experience which either disappoints an expectation, or breaks in upon some 
habit of expectation of the inquisiturus” (Anderson, 1995: 125). Peirce states 
more poignantly, “Inquiry begins with pondering these phenomena in all their 
aspects, in the search of some point of view whence the wonder shall be re‑
solved” (Anderson, 1995: 125). Shall one say with Plato that philosophy begins 
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in wonder or thaumazein? this runs entirely counter to Hume, who dismisses 
surprising deviants out of hand as lies or phantasms, who excludes their pos‑
sibility in advance. Peirce, however, regards those surprising and unexpected 
anomalies — or rather irregularities/discontinuities — as something capable 
of provoking thought, as the very impetus to scientific inquiry. these are not 
excluded by the laws of science but are precisely the very phenomena that 
implore one to broaden the horizons of the same. Science, like philosophy, 
begins in wonder and finds its sustenance in wonder, not in the monotonous 
conformity of confirmation. Peirce is Platonic in this respect and like Plato 
he too implores that explanation — an account that renders the posterior as 
a necessary consequent from a conjectured prius/antecedent — consists in tell‑
ing “likely myths” stories or, to speak Peircean rather than in the language of 
Platonism, it consists in conjecturing to a “plausible” hypothesis. Only an Ar‑
gument rather than Argumentation can lead to an explanation, an account of 
the posterior that renders it a necessary consequence of the antecedent only post 
factum. the antecedent was not necessary beforehand, i.e. not in itself, but only 
afterwards, only as a conditional necessity, i.e. on condition that the conse‑
quent has been given as a Brute experience. the experience, qua Brutal, only 
leads to necessity posthumously, that is post factum. Brutal experience is given 
not as anything necessary, but as a fact, as a contingency which certainly could 
have not been. the conjecture or rogue explanation required to account for an 
anomalous or surprising occurrence — for example, why is there experience 
at all or something at all instead of nothing?! — constitutes the beginning of 
science, both in terms of the impetus for inquisition as well as the “First Stage” 
(Anderson, 1995: 126) of its methodological procedure. this First Stage Peirce 
denominates, in his article outlining the neglected Argument for the reality 
of god, as retroduction — “reasoning from consequent to antecedent” (An‑
derson, 1995: 126) — otherwise known by Peirce as Abduction or Hypothetic 
Inference, which this article hopes to explicate as a method per posterius. In any 
event, the First Stage is regressive but later Stages will exhibit a progressive 
direction.
the First Stage, which posits a hypothesis in an attempt to account for 
a surprising fact, i.e. a fact not to be explained in advance of its facticity, is 
followed by Deductive and Inductive Stages. Both the latter stages must be 
derivative because: “neither Deduction nor Induction contributes the smallest 
positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry. they render the indefi‑
nite definite; Deduction explicates; Induction evaluates: that is all” (Anderson, 
1995: 128).
Deduction and Induction wi l l  elucidate what one has posited in one’s hy‑
pothesis and attempt to determine if these elucidated consequences do in fact 
cohere with experience, be it experience of what is Actually the case or, more 
generally, of the real. In other words, they help one more clearly to formulate 
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what has been hypothesised on the basis of the Brutal experience that pre‑
cedes rule and reason, but they do not play any role prior to the setting of the 
hypothesis and so played no role in determining which hypothesis to postulate, 
in determining which conjecture to venture. now, as is well known, nothing 
that is not contained already in the premises of an argument can validly appear 
anywhere in the conclusions. If Deduction and Induction, then, do not deter‑
mine the hypothesis with which one begins, but only render it determinate, 
then they cannot add one iota to the conclusion of an argument. they only 
help to expose the conclusion’s entailments and, hopefully, also to corroborate 
them. Of course, any hypothesis, in its incubatory state prior to the Deductive 
and Inductive stages, is always a vague one, that is a hypothesis not yet fully ex‑
plicated in all its determinations; it is indefinite but must be rendered definite 
by these following two stages.
the First Stage of Hypothetic Inference is retroductive, i.e. regressive, 
but the second stage, Deduction, is progressive. It moves from the prius 
— the newly and indefinitely defined hypothesis posited in accord with the 
Bruteness of experience — forward to its consequents, i.e. the posterius. 
the Deductive operates a priori or, literally, from the prius forth. the third 
Stage is then Induction, which tests the entailments of the hypothesis as 
procured by the stage of Deduction against the three universes of experi‑
ence, the Bruteness of which always remains as the absolute criterion. All 
three stages, and none in isolation, should constitute the scientific method. 
this account of the scientific method would not preclude phenomena from 
the start that do not already fit neatly under a pre ‑existing explanation, but 
it would be a method that is flexible and malleable, whose borders are fluid in 
just the same measure as the object of inquiry might require a simpler and so 
more concise or a more complex and so heftier explanation. Ockham’s razor 
does not hold at the expense of the criterion of adequacy, though the inverse 
is quite probably true.
A metHOD OF PLAY
this author contends that Peirce’s methodology lends credence to the object of 
study — as delivered through Brute experience, even if only reported through 
testimony — as the absolute criterion, with the result that the object of study 
is never to be altered or rejected in order to find its place under established 
laws, even inductively inscribed laws. Induction is only the second moment 
and not the fact itself, not the criterion itself. One can only judge an experi‑
ence, however, by erecting it as a hypothesis to be studied and not by not 
dismissing it out of hand. Phenomena are not to be contorted in order to fit 
the uniformity of nature, but the uniformity of nature must be malleable 
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enough to expand its borders to regions that can encompass the so ‑called 
“outliers”. the proposal, then, is that the method that permits for itself this 
malleable open ‑endedness can only be one that employs a per posterius, yet pro‑
gressive, mode of inference. On the one hand, traditional empiricism operates 
a posteriori, regressing from the posterior effect to its prior cause. An a priori 
method, on the other hand, employs reason alone, without the least aid of 
experience, operating deductively, beginning with some concept and analyti‑
cally parsing from this prius its necessary entailments. It progresses from the 
prius to the posterius. the novelty of the method espoused by Peirce is that 
its mode of inference or, better, its directionality is neither regressive, that is 
a posteriori or from the posterior, nor progressive, i.e. a priori or from the prior 
forth. Stated more exactly, it is neither of these merely. It is indeed progres‑
sive, but it may only progress by means of the subsequent, i.e. through the 
posterior. It progresses from the prius to the posterior, but only via the vehicle 
of the posterior — namely, the surprising fact that is not to be dismissed out of 
hand! this is also what ensures that the retroductively postulated hypothesis 
is never ad hoc. this also ensures that what eventually finds explanation is not 
the posterius as such, but instead the prius finds explication; it is explicated in all 
of its entailments, which are thus corroborated by the inductive moment. One 
can thus question the meaning of the prius without it always having to appear 
as nothing but a ground or cause for the subsequent, the posterius. If one pro‑
gressed from the prius forth merely, that is only deductively, then surprising 
phenomena would have to be disregarded as phantasmal instead of provoking 
a wonder in the observer that would cause her to broaden the boundaries of her 
own science. If one regressed from the posterius back to the hypothesised cause 
merely, then the antecedent causes that serve to explain the observed phenom‑
ena would never be permitted to radiate forth in their own wonder, but would 
be relegated to indispensable pre ‑conditions without which the posterior could 
not have been — an instance of Hegelism rather Peirceanism!
note the following example. One’s deeds and words often shock, inciting 
wonder and perplexity. What is so astonishing, however, is not the other per‑
son’s deeds or words as such, but rather their will, the prius of their deed, the 
deed being but the posterius of their anterior will. What one wants to explain 
is not actually the deed. One does not simply wish to elucidate all the condi‑
tions necessary for the deed. no, what one really wishes to explain is the will 
of the person, the meaning of the prius, that is the meaning of the deed 
and not just the deed itself. One can only do this, however, by means of or 
through the consequent, that is by means of the deed itself, inclusive of its 
effects. Yet, the consequent deed is not really what is under question; it is not 
what is awe ‑inspiring. A miracle, for example, is not astonishing because of its 
irregularity, lest magic invoke the same awe as the miraculous, but that about 
which one really wonders is the power behind the miracle, which will help to 
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explicate what the miracle means. miracles themselves are signs, as the greek 
word itself — semeion — indicates.6
One may retort that Peirce’s method, at least as employed in the neglected 
Argument for the reality of god, does not posit god as a power “behind” 
miracles or, in fact, behind any particular events as their direct cause. One 
might argue that Peirce’s god is to human understanding what Kant’s god is 
to morality. Just as Kant’s god, rather than being the moral lawgiver or the 
power behind moral acts, is the postulate according to which one acts “as if ” 
the summum bonum or human happiness were commensurable with the supre-
mum bonum, which is not based in god but reason alone, likewise one might 
construe Peirce’s god as that ideal or postulate of rationality which leads one to 
expect that her hypotheses will eventually be, albeit asymptotically, confirmed. 
this permits one to inquire into hypotheses “as if ” nature were ultimately ra‑
tional and uniform. Of course, given how the Bruteness of experience obviates 
the principle of sufficient reason, nature clearly is not ultimately rational — it 
is rather subject to the principle of tychism! — but Peirce’s god, according to 
this line of interpretation, would be the postulate of ultimate rationality or, 
rather, of ultimate regularity and continuity. Against this interpretation one 
can point to the fact that, although Peirce’s god may not be Actual, it is more 
than an impossible, i.e. asymptotic, postulate as a merely fictitious ideal, but 
6  J. m. Bocheński’s book, Die zeitgenössischen Denkmethoden (1993), which offers an 
astonishly clear overview of various methodologies, would likely bring Peirce’s abduction or 
retroduction under the heading of “reduction”. Bocheński’s account of the reductive method 
is offered in pp. 100–104 of this book. While reduction is “structurally” similar to, or even 
identical with, the method espoused here; nevertheless, a method that operates per posterius 
is not really to be thought along the lines of hypothesis formation — despite the fact that 
Peirce also sometimes refers to it as “hypothetic inference” — and the induction of the natural 
sciences. rather, a method operative per posterius is to be thought more along the lines of what 
Bocheński terms the “historical method”, although he numbers this as an extremely special kind 
of reduction. A miraculous event or a historical occurrence both share in common that they are 
a one ‑time occurrence that can never be identically repeated. As Bocheński writes, “Peculiarly, the 
historical sciences offer no general pronouncements” and “those hypotheses and laws” [— if the 
object of this method is even something lawful! —] “which are proposed with the help of such 
general statements are always singular. [Auffallenderweise stellt keine geschichtswissenschaft 
allgemeine Aussagen auf […] die mit ihrer Hilfe aufgestellten Hypothesen und gesetze sind 
immer singulär]” (130). Bocheński then rhetorically wonders, “Why does the historian not 
want to employ induction? [Warum will der Historiker keine Induktion anwenden?]” (132) and 
answers, “the object […] is constituted in such a way that what is of interest in it is something 
individual, not the general. [Der gegenstand […] ist so beschaffen, daβ an ihm gerade das 
Individuelle, nicht das Allgemeine von Interesse ist]” (133). the method under investigation 
in this article concerns the meaning of that which manifests itself historically, e.g. a person. If 
there, in fact, are miraculous events, then they are semeioi, i.e. signs, of the freedom of some 
individual, of a singular will that has enacted said event. Accordingly, it is a properly historical 
object, whereas science customarily limits its investigations to that which permits not signs 
pointing back to an individual, but instantiations of the general and universal.
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something real. this is not to deny that a postulate or a mere Idea cannot be 
of the order of experience for Peirce. Clearly, this falls under the first universe 
of experience. nevertheless, Peirce’s god cannot be a mere postulate or ideal, 
but must be the power “regulating” experience, because, as Peirce says in the 
first line of the neglected Argument, god is “really Creator of all three uni‑
verses of experience”. god is not the mere postulate of the ultimate rationality 
of experience in the sense that Kant’s god was the postulate of morality. god, 
for Peirce, would be the very cause of experience’s givenness rather than that 
element produced through consciousness; god constitutes experience’s Brute‑
ness as such. god would be the hypothesis for the surprising fact that there 
is experience rather no experience at all, that there is something rather than 
nothing. Perhaps, the reality of god will be neither confirmed nor discon‑
firmed as an Actuality by the deductive and inductive moments, but it is a hy‑
pothesis that is not to be dismissed out of hand. As Peirce states, “Any propo‑
sition added to observed facts, tending to make them applicable in any way to 
other circumstances than those under which they were observed, may be called 
a hypothesis” (CP: 6.524). Abduction, Peirce then defines as “a preference for 
any one hypothesis over others which would equally explain the facts, so long 
as this preference is not based upon any previous knowledge bearing upon the 
truth of the hypotheses, nor on any testing of any of the hypotheses, after 
having admitted them on probation” (CP: 6.525). even if it remains always 
only a hypothesis without any empirically repeatable consequences, that does 
not mean that it is without credibility or plausibility. A mere postulate could 
never be “adequate for the conduct of life” (Anderson, 1995: 119). recall as 
well that Peirce suggests that “into what else than «or ig ins» [emphasis added] 
of phenomena (in some sense of that indefinite word) man can inquire” (An‑
derson, 1995: 121). the reality of god, just as the Actuality of a miracle, may 
be nothing empirically verifiable, but what requires explanation is nothing 
empirical anyway, but that “behind” the empirical, the “origin” of experience 
as such, the latter being but an effect for habit ‑inducing — and not belief‑
‑verifying — consciousness. Just as a witness’ testimony for a miracle may be 
the sort of thing that escapes empirical testing, that does not de facto make it 
implausible or worthy of hasty dismissal.
there is no guarantee that rogue events — be they freedom, physical in‑
determinacy, the facticity of the world or miracles — will lead to satisfactory, 
albeit equally rogue, explanations. this is why there is little worth in point‑
ing to a precedent where a strange phenomenon has come to be accepted as 
an event capable of formulation within the bounds of scientific law as already 
formulated. not only would such a happening efface the miraculous quality of 
the event, annexing it into the laws of nature as Hume would have of would‑
‑be miracles, but it would also foster the fallacious opinion that all rogue 
experience or testimony of rogue experience is legitimate if and only if it came 
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to be confirmed rather than disconfirmed or counter ‑balanced. A hypothesis 
founded on a claim to experience demands consideration as such, only to be 
discredited post factum, if at all, but never out of hand, never out of mere prin‑
ciple. As Peirce himself suggests of Hume’s criticism of miracles, “the defini‑
tion he virtually uses is that a miracle is something the like of which has never 
been known to happen. He has completely mistaken the true nature of the 
logic of abduction” (CP: 6.537). this is not to say that Peirce accepted these 
miracles himself as somehow founding the validity of a particular religion. He 
does, however, conclude that Hume, by defining a miracle as a violation of the 
law of nature, most certainly defined a miracle in a way that implied the idea 
of the Law of nature, i.e. Hume added to the definition “a metaphysical turn 
that was quite uncalled for” (CP: 6.540). A miracle must not necessarily be 
restricted to a violation of nature, but it could be nothing more than a great 
wonder that serves to function as a sign ‑event, a semeion. A miracle would be 
but the beginning of wonder, that is thaumazein, which, since Plato, has served 
as the impetus to philosophy/science itself. none of this entails that wonder 
ends in corroboration or probability, only that it demands serious questioning 
and not immediate dismissal. Hume’s position of neglecting unlikelihoods, in 
Peirce’s estimation, may well have been sound even without the metaphysical 
notion of natural Law, but, all the same, something can only appear as likely 
or unlikely after the fact and not in advance, not a priori.
genuine philosophical wonder or the beginning of science must always 
stimulate, as Peirce suggests, open ‑ended and perhaps inconclusive Arguments 
and not definitively conclusive Argumentation. In other words, the wonder 
that marks the beginning of science invokes not at first a formal methodical 
procedure, but, in Peirce’s terms, musement or Pure Play. Science must play, 
abductively hypothesising accounts, before it tests and analyzes the likelihood 
of the proposed account. to play means to test in the sense of curious prob‑
ing, to probe even the boundaries of the game played, adding and discarding 
rules as the need arises. Peirce explains, “Pure Play has no rules, except [the] 
very law of liberty” (Anderson, 1995: 120). Science must not only play, but 
it must play like children, not simply applying but first formulating the rules 
and boundaries as the situation requires. this ensures that nothing escapes 
its vision as matter of principle; it attempts, at least, to see infinitely far off 
places. to limit oneself to the laws of the game as already instituted severely 
minimises one’s field of vision, i.e. the region of possible phenomena, simply 
to the parameters of the prevailing board of play. Pure Play, as suggested by 
Peirce, does not play some game or another — even the established game of 
the scientific community — but it invents games and closes itself off to noth‑
ing as the Bruteness of experience demands. It remains open to all games and 
the concomitant varieties of rule or law. this does not mean that it is without 
rigor and so unscientific, but only that all methods have their own path, their 
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own hodos. the way of approaching surprising phenomena is constructed post 
factum, per posterius and not a priori. As an example of the method of play put 
to practice, this author would point one to Alfred north Whitehead’s philoso‑
phy of organism, which is scientific insofar as it “speculates” upon a discourse 
or interpretive framework that would provide all areas of life, religion included, 
to speak to each other coherently without any discourses being excluded out 
of hand as non ‑scientific. He arguably does this for science in Science and the 
modern world, art and freedom in Adventures of ideas, mathematics in Principia 
mathematica and religion in Religion in the making. Process and reality demon‑
strates how all of these can co ‑exist within a consistent and adequate specu‑
lative framework that refuses to omit any of these domains out of hand. At 
any rate, only the game without any path whatsoever, without any methodol‑
ogy whatsoever is non ‑scientific. that game, however, is no game at all. that 
would be to cease to play at all, to cease to roll the dice, to close off chance and 
view the world according to necessitarianism, precluding even the possibility of 
rogue events or surprise phenomena, “tychic” happenings if one will. Scientists 
should no longer neglect to play. no more neglected Arguments; let the 
boundaries of the game be broadened, perhaps even broken!
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